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Introduction
Every three years, under the New Zealand Superannuation 
and Retirement Income Act 2001 the Commission for 
Financial Literacy and Retirement Income is required to 
conduct a review of retirement incomes, to be submitted 
to the government. This article presents a summary and 
discussion of their 2013 report, entitled Focusing on the 
Future. 
The commission is funded by the 
government, but operates and comments 
as an independent organisation. However, 
the terms for the triennial review are 
determined by agreement between 
the government of the day and the 
commission. Between reviews the 
commission’s work focuses on improving 
New Zealanders’ financial literacy, 
ensuring that there is free and indepen-
dent financial information available, and 
monitoring retirement villages legislation, 
with the overall objective of improving the 
financial well-being of New Zealanders 
throughout their lifetimes.
Retirement income policies cover 
both public provision via New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZS) and the veteran’s 
pension, and private provision through 
KiwiSaver, occupational pensions, and 
private savings through bank deposits, 
shares etc. The split between public and 
private is not clean. Public provision is 
largely funded from current government 
revenue, predominantly taxation revenue 
on a pay-as-you-go basis, although the 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund, built 
up from tax revenue (plus accumulated 
interest), is largely invested in the private 
sector and can be used to smooth NZS 
expenditure flows (Guardians of the 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 
2013). KiwiSaver is operated on a save-
as-you-go basis to individual accounts, 
accumulating interest throughout 
the contribution period, based on 
contributions from employees (who are 
automatically enrolled, with an opt-out 
provision), with employers required to 
provide a matching contribution. There 
is a government tax offset of $1000 upon 
enrolment in the scheme, plus a 50% tax 
credit for contributions to a maximum 
of $521 per annum. This government 
contribution to KiwiSaver amounted to 
$1.05 billion in 2012, or about 12% of 
the current costs of NZS (Dwyer, 2013). 
Other private savings receive no tax 
assistance, and the interest and dividends 
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from the private savings are taxed at the 
individual’s personal income tax rate. 
The 2013 report was able to draw 
upon nine policy position papers and a 
variety of background papers prepared 
for the commission. Each paper related 
to particular aspects of the terms of 
reference, as well as past reviews and 
government responses to those reviews. 
The terms of reference, and the wider 
context surrounding the report, were 
discussed at a workshop held by the 
Institute of Governance and Policy 
Studies. The papers and workshop 
fed into a peer-reviewed discussion 
document. The final report was tabled in 
Parliament in December 2013.
The report
While the report is a stand-alone 
document, it really should be read in 
conjunction with the background and 
position papers. The majority of the report 
relates to future challenges facing both the 
private and public provision of retirement 
income, set in a global and historical 
context. Seventeen recommendations 
were made, covering NZS, KiwiSaver, 
the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 
financial literacy, taxation, age-friendly 
housing and workplaces, and international 
pensions. The executive summary provides 
a succinct abstract of the report.
The global context
The report’s chapter on the global context 
shows that most countries have developed 
distinctive programmes to provide income 
in retirement, with different emphasis on 
the three tiers of pension income – with 
government provision of a universal 
superannuation at age 65, occupational 
pensions and voluntary savings. 
The chapter provides limited 
comparative data on trends in the number 
of pensioners, pension expenditure 
and labour force participation rates. 
Knowledge that most OECD countries 
have an average ratio of government 
pension expenditure relative to national 
output of 9.3% in 2010, which exceeds the 
projected ratio in New Zealand of 7.2% 
in 2050, would have been vital contextual 
material. NZS is affordable by international 
standards: the real issue is whether we 
want to spend that amount of money on 
pensions. The level of expenditure is thus 
a matter of intergenerational equity, and 
thus social (and political) choice, based 
on what the alternative uses are for the 
fiscal expenditure saved if the cost of NZS 
is reduced. 
Instead, the chapter concentrates on 
different scenarios based on the level 
of future economic growth and social 
cohesion, set in a context of likely and 
uncertain global economic, demographic, 
health and societal trends. Economic 
progress and a lack of social cohesion 
could lead to a situation of winners 
versus losers, while economic growth and 
social cohesion should lead to success. A 
failure in economic growth could result 
in a fall in social cohesion or all of us 
struggling together. To be useful, this 
matrix needed to establish the framework 
for the remainder of the document. 
The framework for retirement income
Much of this section of the report is a 
descriptive history, along with information 
on the outcomes of the current framework 
for older New Zealanders. One interesting 
feature is the wide range of programmes 
in existence for pensioners, ranging from 
NZS and KiwiSaver to the SuperGold 
Card, the means-tested assistance of the 
Community Services Card, housing, 
transport and mobility assistance, special 
needs grants, disability support and rates 
rebates. There is little analysis of how 
these programmes developed, how they 
link together, or their fiscal costs and 
distributional effects.
The report shows that two key 
features of retirement income policy – 
lack of compulsion for savings and a lack 
of policy to replicate working income 
levels into retirement – have persisted. 
The report does not state the dominant 
policy objective, which is the adequacy 
of income levels in retirement. Another 
feature overlooked is the constantly 
changing use of the tax system in 
regard to savings, especially in regard 
to occupational pensions: until 1986 
contributions to superannuation funds 
received a tax reduction, but receipt of 
the pension was taxed; between 1986 
and 2006 there were no tax advantages 
from entering occupational pensions 
(leading to a substantial drop in 
participation in occupational pensions), 
but pension receipt was tax free; and post 
2006, KiwiSaver has provided a $1000 
inducement to enter into voluntary 
schemes and a small tax reduction 
on contributions. Given the report’s 
stress on intergenerational equity, some 
analysis should have been made of the 
idiosyncratic nature of the winners 
and losers from these different tax 
treatments. 
The report provides eight objectives, 
which cover the adequacy of income 
support; ensuring financial and social 
well-being; personal responsibility for 
managing of finances; risk-pooling if 
individuals live longer than they expect 
to; a citizenship dividend based on 
past contributions to society; lifetime 
consumption smoothing, due to a 
mismatch through the life cycle between 
needs and income; equity between 
generations so that each generation pays 
taxes roughly equivalent to its pension 
receipt; and the government having a 
sound fiscal position that can permit 
payments of NZS. While the report 
identifies the need to ‘find a balance 
between the [eight] objectives that is 
both politically and fiscally sustainable 
for a long period’ (p.18), it does not cover 
the trade-offs between these objectives. 
For example, improving the adequacy of 
... between 1986 and 2006 there were no tax 
advantages from entering occupational pensions 
(leading to a substantial drop in participation in 
occupational pensions) ... 
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income comes at a fiscal cost; an adequate 
NZS reduces the need for personal 
responsibility to provide adequate 
savings; the baby-boomer bubble reduces 
equity between generations, as current 
pensioners have paid less in tax than 
pension receipt, with the reverse for future 
generations (although the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund was designed to 
offset this imbalance). 
History has shown how politicians 
have constantly meddled with the policy 
framework and parameters, probably 
because of the simplicity of NZS and 
KiwiSaver. Past retirement income reports 
have not led to certainty and confidence 
in the framework, and recommendations 
on raising the age of entitlement for 
NZS have not been politically welcomed. 
The recommendations in this report 
are relatively modest: to raise the age of 
entitlement only in line with increased 
longevity. But this change will not start 
until 2027, meaning that any fiscal savings 
will be very small, especially if offset by 
income-related benefits for those unable 
to remain in employment. 
NZS, plus private provision, has 
generally resulted in very low deprivation 
and income poverty rates for those 
65 and over. However, NZS is only just 
above the 60% of median income poverty 
threshold, so that the very low level of 
additional income most pensioners have 
puts them at risk of poverty, especially 
for non-home owners. As the non-home 
owner group is likely to rise significantly 
in the near future, the adequacy of NZS is 
going to come under increasing pressure, 
with consequential impacts on fiscal 
expenditures, or private savings: all of 
these issues are considered in section 3 of 
the report, ‘Future challenges’. 
Future challenges
Addressing population ageing is the 
major challenge ahead, but the decline 
in home ownership and the increasing 
expectations for rising living standards 
for those aged over 65 should be added 
to the policy mix. Raising tax rates on 
the working-age population to pay for 
the baby boomers’ pensions may result 
in new political configurations due to 
perceived intergenerational inequity: 
for example, how willing will a young 
M~ori population be to support an ageing 
European population, especially if the 
current differential in income and living 
standards continues? 
Fairness of the system
The report states that the key achievement 
of the pension system is social inclusion 
and cohesion. A universal system 
overcomes the stigma from targeting; 
reduces administration costs due to 
complex and ever-changing eligibility 
rules; stops gaming of the pension through 
the formation of trusts and hiding 
income; and encourages the continuation 
of work and savings. The report could 
have indicated how past issues in regard 
to fairness have had political impacts. 
Raising the age of eligibility from 60 
to 65 caused limited resentment, and 
reducing the pension level from 80% of 
earnings to 66% was also seen as fair; but 
the introduction of the tax surcharge on 
non-pension income led to tax avoidance, 
especially via trusts. 
Population ageing
The future cost of population ageing is a 
function of the dependency ratio of the 
working-age population to those over 
65. The report indicates the substantial 
potential impact of increasing labour force 
participation rates among both those in 
the 15–64 age group and the 65-plus age 
group. The experience of a substantial 
rise in the labour participation rates of 
those aged 60–64 following the rise in NZS 
entitlement age in the 1990s could have 
been used as an example of behavioural 
responses to policy change. This example 
would also have provided support for the 
recommendation of increasing the age 
of eligibility as longevity increases. By 
international standards the proposed rate 
of increase in the age of eligibility is very 
slow, and starting at a far later date than 
for most of the OECD: the policy work 
has been done, most of the population are 
familiar with the population ageing issues, 
and the slow rate of change in the age of 
eligibility means that fiscal savings will be 
relatively low. This recommendation seems 
to stem from critical responses to previous, 
more speedy age-raising recommendations, 
as well as political expediency. 
Affording retirement income
Table 9 of the report (p.41), which shows 
the gross public pension expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP for a selection 
of OECD countries, demonstrates the 
relatively low cost of NZS. It would have 
been useful to have had the data in net 
(after tax) figures rather than the gross 
figure which is entered into the national 
accounts. The difference is just under one 
percentage point. Other OECD countries 
(except Australia) have much higher 
expenditure due to an older age structure, 
mainly because of the earnings-related 
nature of most OECD pension schemes, 
where higher pension levels go to those 
who had larger incomes while in work. 
The low cost of NZS is a further reason 
for having a universal, flat-rate pension. 
While the data indicates that there is no 
need for New Zealand to panic, and could 
be used to justify the slow rate of raising 
the age of eligibility from 2027, the report 
states that ‘it makes sense to take steps 
now’ (p.41). 
Raising the age of eligibility from 60 to 65 caused 
limited resentment, and reducing the pension 
level from 80% of earnings to 66% was also seen 
as fair; but the introduction of the tax surcharge 
on non-pension income led to tax avoidance, 
especially via trusts. 
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Figures 5 and 6 (pp.42 and 43) 
compare current expenditures on health, 
NZS, education and non-NZS welfare 
expenditures, with three alternative 
scenarios: 
1. cost-pressure increases based on past 
growth rates; 
2. net debt stabilised at 20% of GDP;
3. the current population age structure 
maintained into the future: this 
scenario shows how much of the 
cost increase is due to age structure 
changes. 
The cost pressure increase is large for 
health and NZS and downward for the 
other items of social expenditure. The 
ageing population impact explains most 
of the estimated four-percentage-point 
increase in health and NZS expenditures 
to 2050. 
Options for reducing the cost of NZS
The options need to be seen in relation 
to other aspects of retirement income, 
especially KiwiSaver. 
1. Raising the age of eligibility. The 
report argues that ‘[r]aising the age 
will also save money’ (p.44, italics 
added) – presumably this means 
fiscal savings, as individuals just 
turning 65 will lose money. The 
cumulative impact is a significant 
fiscal saving on pensions, especially 
with increases in labour force 
participation, but the savings need 
to be offset by greater expenditure 
on income-related benefits. The 
proposal to raise the eligibility age in 
line with changes in longevity seems 
logical, but does not give certainty 
to individuals or fiscal forecasters, 
and would have high administration 
costs with constant changes in the 
eligibility age. 
2. Changing the method of indexation. In 
the 1990s, when adjustments to the 
pension were based on movements 
in the consumers price index 
(CPI) rather than average income, 
income poverty quickly emerged for 
pensioners with limited additional 
income. (The post-1999 Labour-
led governments raised pensions 
back to 66% of average wages.) The 
report recognises this possibility and 
recommends using the average of 
wage growth and CPI movements. 
This approach should maintain 
current living standards and provide 
for some of the benefits of economic 
growth. The report also recommends 
greater use of targeted second-tier 
benefits, but this would reduce the 
desired level of fiscal savings. 
3. The impact of KiwiSaver. The report 
correctly indicates that ‘KiwiSaver 
is additive to NZS, not a substitute’ 
(p.46) and represents the second 
tier of pension schemes. But the 
report requests further research on 
how KiwiSaver could impact on 
the method of indexation. Using 
KiwiSaver to lower the rate of 
adjustment of the pension level could 
be seen as a back-door method of 
means-testing for NZS. 
5. Varying the age of eligibility. People 
could delay the time of receipt of 
NZS and receive a higher pension as 
a result. There should be no future 
fiscal impact if pension levels are 
actuarially calculated. Compared to 
raising the age for all, it would assist 
those retiring early or with a lower 
life expectancy. It would increase the 
risk for those making an incorrect 
estimate of their longevity, making 
them more vulnerable to income 
poverty. 
The proceeds from the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund can be used as 
a form of intergenerational transfer 
of the cost of NZS. Current working 
baby boomers are paying less tax than 
required to sustain their NZS, and 
making contributions to the Super Fund. 
The fund provides a useful mechanism 
to spread the tax burden fairly across 
generations, thus improving the 
affordability of NZS. The fund improves 
the level of savings, and, if it continues 
to be sensibly invested, can increase the 
rate of economic growth. But additions 
to the fund are only sensible if the return 
on the fund is greater than the interest 
cost of government debt. The report 
recommends that the fund’s returns be 
made tax exempt, which would treat 
them similarly to those of ACC and EQC, 
but be out of line with the additional tax 
burden that is placed on the returns from 
private savings. 
The report’s conclusions on the 
options are appropriate: ‘the issue that 
arises is not so much one of affordability 
as of future generations’ ability and 
willingness to pay the additional cost’ 
(p.47).
New Zealand’s saving performance
There is considerable concern and 
debate as to whether New Zealanders 
are saving sufficiently to supplement 
NZS and maintain their pre-retirement 
income. Macroeconomic data shows that 
aggregate savings are potentially negative. 
The macro data looks at economy-wide 
savings, including public, external and 
individual debt as well as personal savings. 
The data does not allow an assessment of 
whether individual savings are adequate 
for a desired retirement income, nor 
the extent to which KiwiSaver accounts 
are offset by reductions in other private 
savings. Overseas evidence suggests that 
the extent of transference between forms 
of savings is substantial. The New Zealand 
evidence indicates that only a third of 
contributions to KiwiSaver represent 
additional savings (p.66), as many private 
occupational pension schemes have been 
rolled into KiwiSaver. 
The New Zealand evidence indicates that only 
a third of contributions to KiwiSaver represent 
additional savings (p.66), as many private 
occupational pension schemes have been rolled 
into KiwiSaver. 
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The microeconomic data indicates 
a general adequacy of savings to 
maintain pre-retirement income. There 
are substantial differences in the level 
of household savings by gender, age, 
ethnicity, income levels when in work, 
home ownership etc., with adverse events 
such as poor health, redundancy, divorce 
or death of a spouse also exacerbating 
individual differences in savings levels. 
Maintaining the level of NZS is a 
necessary safety net to offset these risks 
and lifestyle events. 
Savings are not necessarily beneficial 
for an economy. Savings reduce 
consumption levels, and thus production 
and employment. Savings have to go into 
new productive investment to make a 
contribution to economic growth, but are 
often invested overseas, or into housing 
as a rental investment, which can raise 
house prices and rents. Reduced levels of 
home ownership in future will affect the 
adequacy of NZS for renters. The report 
provides limited direct recommendations 
to address this issue. 
Further, aggregate savings only 
increase while the fund is building up: 
when mature, the savings fund will remain 
constant, or, with an ageing population, 
fall. Some 72% of those aged 65 and 
over intend to withdraw their savings 
from KiwiSaver over the next five years, 
generally in a lump sum (Dwyer, 2013). 
The impact of this on aggregate savings 
depends on whether these funds are used 
for current consumption (overseas trip, 
payment of debt, etc.) or reinvested.
KiwiSaver
KiwiSaver, which started in 2007, is a 
‘voluntary’ occupational pension scheme 
designed to increase individual retirement 
income. Contribution rates are relatively 
low at 3%, though 36% of members have 
a 4% contribution rate. The report states 
that only half of eligible New Zealand 
residents are members, but this includes 
those aged over 65 or who are not in the 
workforce. 67% of people aged 18–24 are 
members, indicating a degree of acceptance 
among the younger generation, possibly 
due to a belief that NZS will no longer 
exist when they retire (Pinkerton, 2010), 
and the potential use of KiwiSaver funds 
as a deposit for home purchase. 
KiwiSaver has become a political 
football, with changes to the employee 
and employer contribution rates and 
tax liabilities. The report does not 
advocate compulsory membership, but 
would like to see a more active approach 
to enrolment, with greater financial 
education. The report supports the 
administrative, compliance, enforcement 
and monitoring aspects of KiwiSaver 
developed since 2007. It supports 
maintaining the use of a single account 
for each member whenever members 
change employment. 
Adequacy of income in retirement
The amount of income from savings in 
retirement is partly a function of the ability 
to save and desired standards of living in 
retirement, complicated by unknown 
longevity, the after-tax interest rate on 
savings, and the degree to which assets 
are run down in retirement. This latter 
feature is overlooked in the report. The 
commission’s Sorted website concentrates 
on the level of current savings for that 
adequate income, but not possible means 
of asset rundown (decumulation) to 
maintain post-retirement income levels 
(Rashbrooke, 2014). Scenarios can be 
done on an actuarial basis (requiring 
costly financial advice) or by self-help. The 
Sorted website could indicate that, with a 
portfolio of assets, one bundle could be 
set aside for the rainy day, greater-than-
expected longevity or for inheritance. 
Then, with different net interest rates 
and varying amounts of drawdown, it 
could indicate how long the other assets 
would last; if too short or long, then the 
decumulation rate can be adjusted. The 
report recommends only the development 
of an Ministry of Social Development 
discussion document on decumulation.
Housing
The report covers the impact of home 
ownership and housing costs on the 
adequacy of retirement income.  Those 
who own their homes generally have 
a higher standard of living, are able to 
maintain their independence longer, and 
have a better standard of accommodation. 
Those in rental accommodation tend to 
have a high rate of income poverty (Perry, 
2013). 
Home owners have an asset which 
could be used to enhance current living 
standards, through equity release schemes, 
where the asset value is converted to 
an income stream or lump sum, or 
by downsizing into a smaller property 
(Davey, 2005). The report indicates 
the limitations of both approaches. 
Equity release has issues with estimating 
longevity and high interest rates. 
Downsizing may be restricted by a lack 
of availability of smaller dwellings with 
ready access to transport, and the capital 
released may be too small to generate a 
satisfactory income stream. Movement 
into retirement villages may release some 
financial capital, but incurs regular fees 
and complex legal issues. 
 The recommendation is for yet 
another review, to find ways of increasing 
the supply of age-friendly housing, 
presumably covering issues of design, 
transport and access to amenities. 
Continued employment
Adequacy of income can be maintained 
by continuing to work beyond the age of 
eligibility for NZS. The universal nature 
of the pension, with no income test, 
along with the absence of a compulsory 
retirement age encourage labour force 
participation. Over the 22-year period 
from 1991 to 2013 the proportion of 
people 65 years and over participating 
[the 2013 retirement income report] lack of 
coverage and influence should be of grave concern 
to policy makers who have to consider long-term 
fiscal impacts from population ageing.
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in the labour force has increased from 
5.8% to 22.5% (Statistics New Zealand, 
2014). This rise in the participation rate 
reflects reduced employer discrimination 
against older workers, skill shortages and 
a willingness of employees to continue 
working (Davey, 2014). Not all are able or 
wish to. Attitudinal change needs to start 
when a worker is younger. Other factors 
are a possibility of retraining, part-time 
work, adjustment for health status or job 
change (e.g. going from being a builder to 
a building inspector).
The report is neutral on the ‘lump 
of labour’ theory, which posits that 
employment of older workers reduces 
employment for younger people. 
The majority of research rejects the 
hypothesis. 
The report’s recommendation is 
weak. It calls for the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment to ‘work 
with employers, industry associations and 
unions to implement ways to encourage 
the recruitment, retention, retraining and 
mobility between jobs of older workers’ 
(p.83). 
Financial literacy
The report agrees with the trend towards 
greater individual responsibility for 
retirement income, provided that 
responsibility is underpinned by NZS. 
Making KiwiSaver compulsory reduces 
the risk for workers, but compulsion is not 
recommended due to compliance costs, 
savings substitutions, greater financial 
burdens for low-income earners, and lack 
of incentives for financial advisers. Greater 
financial literacy is seen as the preferred 
mechanism, giving individuals the ability 
to make appropriate savings decisions, 
rather than compulsion. 
The Sorted campaign certainly tries 
to provide financial advice, but there is 
limited discussion here about how many 
people actually use the service and act on 
its information. The report would like to 
see financial advice provided through the 
workplace as well as its own programmes 
to increase financial literacy. However, 
most people receive information from 
banks, which tend to push their own 
products; family or friends, who are 
not always well informed; or financial 
advisers who are not always well known 
or trusted. The recommendation to give 
the commission ‘an explicit mandate to 
lead the provision of financial education’ 
(p.87) would probably have limited 
impact on the status quo. 
The report fails to consider issues 
round the appropriate timing of savings. 
It assumes that saving from a young age 
is the best option, due to the impact of 
accumulated interest. Taking account 
of the life cycle could provide greater 
flexibility for savings levels, with high 
savings rates before the arrival of children 
(and thus a base from which interest can 
accumulate), low savings when equivalent 
income falls because of the extra costs 
associated with children and often a 
shift to one income, then higher savings 
rates when the children have left home. 
Of course, many do not fit this picture, 
but at least acknowledging the benefits 
of flexibility in savings rates, with some 
instructive guidance, may help even out 
income and expenditures and provide for 
greater income adequacy over the whole 
life cycle, not just when over 65. 
Future directions
This section covers the recommendations 
made in the body of the report, on keeping 
NZS fair and affordable; KiwiSaver; the 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund; 
financial literacy; taxation; age-friendly 
housing; age-friendly workplaces; 
and international pensions. When the 
recommendations are put in one place, the 
document seems very conservative, which 
is probably because past reports have been 
largely ignored by governments. Being 
published just prior to Christmas 2013, 
the report received limited media coverage 
and probably had limited influence within 
government circles. This lack of coverage 
and influence should be of grave concern 
to policy makers who have to consider 
long-term fiscal impacts from population 
ageing. Individuals should be concerned, 
as the lack of detailed policy development 
gives politicians too many opportunities 
to alter both NZS and KiwiSaver. The 
hard decisions are left for other reviews, 
but the commission has been around 
long enough to have done the required 
analysis themselves. 
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